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課程名稱 |
進階公司理財
Advanced Corporate Finance |
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開課學期 |
104-1 |
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授課對象 |
社會科學院 經濟學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
吳儀玲 |
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課號 |
ECON7051 |
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課程識別碼 |
323 M7170 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
2 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期五3,4(10:20~12:10) |
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上課地點 |
社科研609 |
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備註 |
限碩士班以上
總人數上限：20人 |
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Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1041ECON7051_ |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
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課程概述 |
This is an advanced course in corporate finance. Its goal is to bring Ph.D. students to the frontier of knowledge so that they can start doing their own research in this field.
The course will cover seven topics, each of which will take about two sessions. The goal will be to combine theory and empirical work, and to bring students to the state of the art in that subfield, so that they potentially begin to do research in that area.
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課程目標 |
待補 |
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課程要求 |
There will be a referee report due on an article that I will hand out in class. Write the report as a reviewer for potential publication in a major academic finance journal, up to three well-spaced pages. Part 1 of each report should succinctly state each of the paper’s important contributions in the best possible light. Part 2 should constructively critique any shortcomings. Part 3 should make suggestions for improvements. This report should be accompanied with a short letter to the editor (me), recommending that I reject the paper, request a revision, or accept the paper, and why. The report will count for 20% of the grade. |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
待補 |
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參考書目 |
A. The Entrenchment Problem
Demsetz, H. (1983) "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1989) "Managerial Entrenchment: The Case of Firm-Specific Assets," Journal of Financial Economics.
* Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1988) "Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Financial Economics.
Holderness, C., R. Kroszner, and D. Sheehan (1999) “Were the Good Old Days that Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression,” Journal of Finance, 54, 435-469.
B. Incentive Contracts and Other Direct Incentives
* Jensen, M. and K. Murphy (1990) "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225-264.
* Hall, B. and J. Liebman (1998) “Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 653-691.
Haubrich, J. (1994) "Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem," Journal of Political Economy.
Hall, B. and K. Murphy (2003) “The Trouble with Stock Options,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, (Number 3), 49-70.
Bebchuk, L, and J. Fried (2003) “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, (Number 3), 71-92.
Kaplan, Steven and Joshua Rauh (2010) “Wall Street and Main Street: What contributes to the Rise in the Highest Incomes,” Review of Financial Studies.
C. Boards of Directors
* Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach (1998) “Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of Management”, American Economic Review, Vol. 88 (March, 1998), pp. 96-118.
* Weisbach, M. (1988) "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 431-460.
Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach (2003) “Boards of Directors as an Endogenously-Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Evidence,” Economic Policy Review, 9, Number 1.
Adams, R., B. Hermalin and M. Weisbach, (2010) “Boards of Directors and their Role in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey”, Journal of Economic Literature, 48, 58-107.
Shivdasani, A. and David Yermack (1999) “CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Finance, 54, pp. 1829-1854.
D. Management Turnover
Bertrand, M. and A. Schoar (2003) “Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1169-1208.
Pan, Yihui, Tracy Wang, and M. Weisbach (2013) “Learning About CEO Ability and Stock Return Volatility,” Working Paper.
Pan, Yihui, Tracy Wang, and M. Weisbach (2013) “CEO Investment Cycles,” Working Paper.
E. Proxy Voting and Institutional Activism
* Zingales, L. (1995) “What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1047-1073.
Zingales, L. (1994) "The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange," Review of Financial Studies, 7, 125-148.
* Del Guercio, D. and J. Hawkins (1999) “The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism,” Journal of Financial Economics, 52, 293-340.
Carleton, W., J. Nelson, and M. Weisbach (1998) “The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF” The Journal of Finance, 53, pp. 1335-1362.
Brav, A., W. Jiang, F. Partnoy, and R. Thomas (2008) “Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 63. pp. 1729-1775.
F. Employee Pension Funds
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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第1週 |
09/18 |
Syllabus and Preparing a Referee Report: Guidelines and Perspectives |
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第2週 |
9/18 |
Topic 1. Corporate Governance and Control: Proxy voting and institutional activism |
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第2週 |
9/25 |
Topic 2. Corporate Governance and Control: Incentive contracts and other direct incentives |
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第3週 |
10/02 |
Topic 3. Corporate Governance and Control: Management turnover |
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第4週 |
10/09 |
Referee report paper |
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第4週 |
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Management turnover |
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第5週 |
10/16 |
Paper presentation slots |
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第5週 |
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Tournament incentives |
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第6週 |
10/23 |
Topic 1: The effect of information quality on liquidity risk |
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